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SEE NO FIDUCIARY, HEAR NO FIDUCIARY:  
A LAWYER’S KNOWLEDGE WITHIN AIDING 
AND ABETTING FIDUCIARY BREACH CLAIMS 
Brinkley Rowe* 
 
To me, a lawyer is basically the person that knows the rules of the country.  
We’re all throwing the dice, playing the game, moving our pieces around 
the board, but if there’s a problem, the lawyer is the only person that has 
read the inside of the top of the box. 
 
–Jerry Seinfeld1 
 
Fiduciary liability for attorney conduct generally extends only to direct 
clients of legal services.  Over the last few decades, however, the lawyer’s 
role has expanded.  Following this trend, fiduciary liability also has 
expanded to allow third-party claims in certain limited circumstances.  One 
example is the attorney aiding and abetting a client’s fiduciary breach claim. 
One of the key requirements for liability under this claim is the attorney’s 
knowledge of his client’s fiduciary relationship with the third party alleging 
the breach.  Within those jurisdictions that have accepted the claim, there are 
two approaches to the knowledge element.  The first is the constructive 
knowledge standard that permits liability if the attorney knew or reasonably 
should have known of the fiduciary relationship.  The second approach is the 
actual knowledge standard that requires overt and obvious evidence of 
fiduciary knowledge.  In addition to these standards, a third approach 
ignores the knowledge element entirely:  the qualified immunity standard that 
protects attorneys against third-party liability as long as the conduct falls 
within an attorney-client relationship.  This Note argues for the rejection of 
constructive knowledge and adoption of either the qualified immunity or 
actual knowledge standard for numerous doctrinal and policy reasons while 
maintaining the claim’s original policy goals. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Tufts University.  
Thank you to Professor Martin Gelter for his advice and expertise throughout this process.  I 
also want to thank my wife Anna and my family for their unwavering support through this 
process.  In loving memory of my grandfather and namesake, Brinkley Snowden Rowe (1928–
2015), who passed away as this work was taking shape. 
 
 1. The Visa, SEINFELD SCRIPTS, https://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheVisa.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BNJ4-3M3K]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, a venture capital firm called Founders Funding Group, Inc. (FFG) 
was incorporated in the State of Oregon.2  By early 1993, William Granewich 
II, Ben Harding, and Jeannie Alexander-Hergert each owned one-third of the 
voting shares of FFG.3  On May 5, 1993, Harding and Alexander-Hergert 
informed Granewich that he was “relieved . . . of his executive position, and 
terminated him as an employee, all effective immediately.”4  To give effect 
to this action, Harding and Alexander-Hergert hired the law firm of Martin, 
Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet & Hoffman (“the Lawyers”) for the purpose 
of “drafting and sending two letters to [Granewich] . . . containing statements 
that the lawyers knew to be false concerning the effectiveness of Harding’s 
and Alexander-Hergert’s previous efforts to remove [Granewich] from 
[FFG].”5  Going forward, the Lawyers then “assisted Harding and Alexander-
Hergert in exercising actual control of the management and policies of 
FFG . . . by calling special meetings, amending corporate by-laws, removing 
[Granewich] as a director, and taking other actions to dilute the value of 
[Granewich’s] FFG stock.”6  Accordingly, Granewich sued his former 
partners for breach of fiduciary duty,7 including a claim against the Lawyers 
 
 2. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791 (Or. 1999). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 791–92. 
 7. See id. 
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alleging that they aided and abetted the breach of Harding’s and Alexander-
Hergert’s fiduciary duty owed to Granewich as a business partner.8 
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that Granewich had adequately alleged 
a valid cause of action against the Lawyers under Oregon law.9  In doing so, 
this decision echoed a recent trend that extends a lawyer’s liability beyond 
the traditional bounds of the attorney-client relationship:  recognition of a 
lawyer’s liability to a nonclient for aiding and abetting a breach of her client’s 
fiduciary duty owed to a third party.10  Within those jurisdictions that have 
accepted this doctrine,11 most acknowledge the same basic framework of the 
claim.12  However, there is a significant divide among state jurisdictions as 
to the degree of a lawyer’s fiduciary knowledge required to adequately show 
a valid claim:  while some states, such as Delaware or Illinois, require an 
attorney to have “actual knowledge” of her client’s fiduciary relationship 
(and associated breaches) with the allegedly injured third party, other states, 
such as Minnesota and South Dakota, only require that a lawyer had 
“constructive knowledge.”13 
This divergence of knowledge standards is important for a few reasons.  
First, the expansion of the lawyer’s role within society has led to an 
increasing number of fiduciary breach claims against attorneys leveled by 
nonclient parties in the last ten to fifteen years.14  One of the primary 
examples of such claims is the assertion that an attorney aided and abetted a 
client’s fiduciary breach.15  This trend accordingly emphasizes the 
importance of the fault lines within each of the claim’s defining elements.  
This Note focuses on the element of a lawyer’s knowledge.16 
 
 8. See id.  Specifically, the claim proceeded by alleging that the Lawyers knowingly 
facilitated Granewich’s removal from FFG by calling unauthorized meetings of shareholders 
and made unauthorized changes to FFG’s operating documents. 
 9. See id. at 795–96. 
 10. See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers:  The Rise of Claims Against 
Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 
135–36 (2008). 
 11. All state supreme courts that have addressed these claims, with the exception of 
Georgia, have recognized a cause of action for a lawyer’s aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty (totaling twenty-one states, albeit with different elements and caveats attached). 
See id. at 136; see also Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. 
LAW. 1135, 1159 (2006). 
 12. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 143–46. 
 13. See id. at 151–53 (articulating the standard as to whether the lawyer in question knew 
or reasonably should have known of the fiduciary relationship between her client and the 
plaintiff third party).  Notably, this requirement can often be satisfied by a mere showing of a 
long-term or close relationship as well as other similarly minor showings of a reasonable basis 
for knowledge of a fiduciary relationship. 
 14. “[A]s individuals and business associations have become increasingly reliant upon 
experts and specialists to provide ever more critical advice and professional services, it should 
come as no surprise that [fiduciary breach] claims, especially against attorneys, are on the 
rise.” Terry Jennings, Fiduciary Litigation in Texas, 69 TEX. B.J. 844, 850 (2006). 
 15. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation:  
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
213, 241 (1996). 
 16. See id. at 242. 
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Second, the aiding and abetting cause of action overall provides an 
exception to a well-established rule of lawyer-client relationships.17  As this 
Note discusses, attorney liability for malpractice is generally limited only to 
conduct that falls within the direct attorney-client relationship.18  The aiding 
and abetting doctrine deviates from this maxim by providing an avenue for 
attorney liability to nonclient third parties. 
Third, the validity of the aiding and abetting fiduciary breach cause of 
action has not been assessed in twenty-nine states.19  As a result, the 
application of the doctrine’s elements in new jurisdictions to new factual 
contexts has the potential to entirely change the logical contours of the claim.  
Thus, it is critical to identify doctrinally beneficial approaches and jettison 
those that are not.  This Note marks a beginning to the required elemental 
analysis starting with the claim’s knowledge element. 
Finally, the definition of a lawyer’s fiduciary knowledge remains an 
unresolved question among the jurisdictions that have already deemed the 
overall claim valid.20  Resolution of this latchkey element can provide a 
cohesive evidentiary framework that not only results in efficient and fair 
policy outcomes but also fits well within the wider doctrine of civil liability.  
Such a result will then also provide effective guidance for jurisdictions 
examining the claim for the first time.  Conversely, failure to articulate a 
doctrinally and socioeconomically sound analysis of the knowledge element 
could lead to unbridled liability against lawyers, erosion of the trust central 
to the attorney-client relationship, and disruption of economic frameworks 
that take the stability of attorney-client relationships for granted.21 
To date, other works have examined the genesis and subsequent evolution 
of the aiding and abetting doctrine as well as commented generally upon the 
 
 17. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ 
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1552 (1994). 
 18. See infra Part II (articulating the general rule of no attorney liability to nonclient third 
parties for malpractice). 
 19. At the time of writing, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, 
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin have recognized the claim of aiding and abetting a client’s fiduciary breach as a 
valid basis for liability. See Mason, supra note 11, at 1159 (noting that Georgia has 
affirmatively denied the claim’s existence and Pennsylvania law remains conflicted on the 
existence of the claim).  While Illinois has not formally recognized this cause of action, the 
Illinois Supreme Court has recognized an analogous tort of knowingly participating in, or 
intentionally inducing, a breach of fiduciary duty. See In re Chi. Trading Grp., Inc., No. 97 B 
19843, 2001 WL 40071, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2001).  Notably, the aiding and 
abetting doctrine impacts fiduciary liability for many professions in addition to the law. See 
Lesavoy v. Gattullo-Wilson, 170 F. App’x 721, 723–24 (2d Cir. 2006) (concerning extension 
of nonclient fiduciary liability to brokers); In re Sharp, 302 B.R. 760, 784 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(concerning extension of nonclient fiduciary liability to bankers); N.J. Dep’t of Treasury v. 
Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 904 A.2d 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (concerning 
extension of nonclient fiduciary liability to accountants). 
 20. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 145–48. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
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divergence of knowledge standards among the currently accepting states.22  
However, this Note is the first effort to both specifically examine the merits 
of the various approaches to the knowledge element and make appropriate 
recommendations for a future approach.  Part I provides a background to civil 
liability leading to the advent of the attorney aiding and abetting fiduciary 
breach claim.  Part II then examines the existing conflict between 
jurisdictions concerning the knowledge element.  Finally, Part III argues for 
the rejection of constructive knowledge frameworks and provides guidelines 
in favor of either qualified immunity or actual knowledge standards 
(depending on the circumstances and policy objectives of an examining 
court) as superior replacements. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF GENERAL CIVIL LIABILITY 
This part outlines the history that lays the groundwork underlying civil 
liability as a precursor to the aiding and abetting fiduciary breach doctrine.  
Part I.A outlines the common law “privity” liability requirement, initially 
translated into American law from English origins, and its subsequent 
downfall with then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s famous articulation of the 
duty of care.  Part I.B then summarizes the later evolution of fiduciary duty 
doctrine as a higher degree of obligation owed by parties to each other within 
particular relationships.  Finally, Part I.C culminates with the outline of the 
attorney aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim in its most typically 
accepted form. 
A.  The Origins of Civil Liability 
Prior to the twentieth century, the duty owed by one party to another in tort 
was restricted to instances where the injured party was in privity with the 
alleged wrongdoer.23  In the seminal case of Winterbottom v. Wright,24 the 
English Court of the Exchequer held that an injured party must be in a direct 
contractual relationship with the manufacturer or caretaker of a product in 
order to bring a valid claim for civil liability against another party.25 
In a decision that directly addressed a question of attorney tort liability, the 
U.S. Supreme Court explicitly adopted Winterbottom’s privity requirement 
in Savings Bank v. Ward26 by holding that an injured party could not sustain 
 
 22. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 135–36; see also Colin P. Marks, Piercing the 
Fiduciary Veil, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 73 (2015); Mason, supra note 11; Pietrusiak, Jr., 
supra note 15. 
 23. Often referred to as a “tortfeasor.”  While some jurisdictions observe fiduciary breach 
claims as a separate species of claim, this Note accepts the use of the language surrounding 
tort doctrine for the purposes of discussion. 
 24. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402. 
 25. See id.  The product in question here was a mail coach serviced by Winterbottom for 
the postmaster general.  However, Winterbottom’s contract was only with the postmaster 
general and not with individual mail carriers employed by the postmaster (such as the injured 
party, Wright). 
 26. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).  This case provides an early example of the general rule of no 
malpractice liability of attorneys to nonclients. 
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a claim against an attorney with whom there was no privity of contract.27  The 
majority opinion in Savings Bank provides policy justifications for privity as 
a general boundary line for tort liability, including the unwarranted and 
unlimited extension of liability beyond contracting parties.28  Further, the 
Court articulates the concern that extension of liability beyond the attorney-
client relationship would be tantamount to taking control of a contract away 
from the parties by allowing liability outside of the relationship defined by 
that contract.29  However, Chief Justice Morrison Waite’s dissent provides a 
glimmer of justification for rejecting the privity limitation by articulating, “I 
think if a lawyer . . . knows or ought to know [his work product] is to be used 
by the client in some business transaction with another person[,] . . . he is 
liable to such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting 
from [the lawyer’s] failure” to adequately advise his client.30  The dissent’s 
reasoning laid the groundwork for (arguably) the most famous case in all of 
tort doctrine addressing the duty of care. 
Conversely, Macpherson v. Buick31 later rejected Winterbottom’s privity-
based liability limitations in favor of allowing negligence claims asserting a 
duty of care to persist.32 
Judge Cardozo’s opinion famously dismissed the privity limitation by 
asserting that “[i]f the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain 
to . . . [cause] peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of 
danger . . . .  [If] there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by 
persons other than the purchaser . . . irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer . . . is under a duty to make it carefully.”33  While Macpherson 
created and oriented a general duty of care within the negligence claim, the 
doctrine remained unresolved as to how liability of parties to one another 
should be addressed within close-knit “fiduciary” relationships surrounding 
claims beyond negligence.  As this Note underscores, privity and similarly 
relationship-based definitions of liability remain important doctrinal fault 
 
 27. See id. at 207. 
 28. Thereby overwhelming judicial resources, according to the reasoning of the Court at 
the time. 
 29. See Sav. Bank, 100 U.S. at 203.  Further justification of privity as a limitation on 
liability in this particular instance could be supported by a desire to preserve the relationship 
of trust that exists between a lawyer and their client. See William L. Siegel, Attorney Liability:  
Is This the New Twilight Zone?, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 13 (1996). 
 30. Sav. Bank, 100 U.S. at 207.  Interestingly, even at this early stage, the language of the 
dissent implies a constructive knowledge standard when addressing liability outside of an 
attorney-client relationship. 
 31. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 32. See id.  The case presented facts shockingly similar to Winterbottom, involving a claim 
asserted by the purchaser of a car from a middleman dealership against the original 
manufacturer.  For a full discussion of this shift away from privity and toward the present 
negligence framework incorporating the duty of care, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998).  For a full historical 
treatment of privity’s original role in civil liability doctrine and the subsequent shift away from 
its use as an analytical tool, see Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient 
Third Parties—at What Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 3–14 (1989). 
 33. Macpherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.  Notice again that the language of departure from 
privity is centered around the requirement of knowledge on the part of the alleged tortfeasor 
as to the connection between the contracting party and the injured party bringing the claim. 
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lines for limiting the extension of fiduciary liability beyond the norm of the 
attorney-client relationship.34  However, Judge Cardozo recognized the 
doctrinal gap of liability-defining obligations for fiduciaries beyond the 
negligence doctrine defined by Macpherson. 
B.  The Rise of Fiduciary Liability 
The seminal case of Meinhard v. Salmon35 took civil liability a step further:  
it analyzed the duties owed by fiduciaries to each other beyond the 
negligence-based duty of care defined in Macpherson.36  Judge Cardozo’s 
Meinhard opinion famously defined the duty owed by one business owner to 
his partner as “the duty of the finest loyalty . . . .  A [fiduciary] is held to 
something stricter than [a regular duty of care] . . . .  Not honesty alone, but 
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behavior.”37  Since Meinhard, the doctrine of fiduciary duty has been 
characterized as consisting of subdivisions varying by situation.38  
Accordingly, the fiduciary duty doctrine has evolved to be highly scenario 
specific.39  Amid the existing liability questions surrounding relationships 
between parties, the current state of the doctrine revives the question posed 
by Justice Waite’s dissenting Savings Bank opinion40:  Can lawyers ever be 
liable when their clients breach a fiduciary duty owed to a third party?  The 
answer is a very qualified “yes.” 
C.  The Claim of a Lawyer’s Aiding and Abetting 
a Client’s Fiduciary Breach 
An attorney generally does not owe a fiduciary duty to a nonclient and thus 
is not typically susceptible to liability stemming from a fiduciary breach 
injuring a nonclient.41  However, within the wider realm of civil aiding and 
 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
 36. It did so by addressing disputes between parties within a closer, “fiduciary” 
relationship, triggering obligations beyond the negligence framework addressed in 
Macpherson. 
 37. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
 38. Some courts and scholars have articulated fiduciary duty as consisting of two distinct 
subdivisions:  the duty of care normally imposed under a negligence framework and the duty 
of loyalty as a separate framework.  Others characterize the doctrine as further incorporating 
the duties of honesty, disclosure, and candor.  For a full examination of the varying scholarly 
lenses surrounding fiduciary duty obligations, see Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef?:  
Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware Corporations’ Directors in the Wake of Malone, 
6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 14 n.96 (2000). 
 39. For a further exploration of the varying manners and degrees of judicial fiduciary 
liability application, see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (characterizing fiduciary liability as “situation-specific” 
applying with “greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of parties 
and relationships”).  For an illustrative example of the placement of good faith within the 
doctrine of fiduciary duty, see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366–71 (Del. 2006). 
 40. See Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 195 (1879). 
 41. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 137; see also Jessica Palvino, Aiding-and-Abetting 
Liability:  Is Privity Making a Comeback?, 70 TEX. B.J. 52 (2007) (discussing the response of 
Texas courts to the rise of the aiding and abetting doctrine); Siegel, supra note 29, at 16 
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abetting claims, recent state supreme court decisions,42 the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,43 and the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing 
Lawyers44 permit a cause of action for a lawyer’s aiding and abetting her 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty.45  While the elements necessary to qualify 
for this relatively new cause of action vary by jurisdiction, they generally 
consist of the following:  (1) the presence of a fiduciary duty owed by the 
attorney’s client to a nonclient third party, (2) breach of that fiduciary duty 
by the attorney’s client, (3) the attorney’s fiduciary knowledge,46 and (4) 
substantial assistance provided by the attorney to her client in propagating 
the breach.47  While certain jurisdictions have not addressed the validity of 
this liability, all jurisdictions that have examined it have accepted the doctrine 
as valid.48  Within these accepting jurisdictions, state courts differ as to the 
required degree of knowledge that an attorney must have of (1) the fiduciary 
relationship between her client and the nonclient injured party and (2) breach 
by her client of their fiduciary duty as a result of her legal advice.49 
II.  THE THIRD ELEMENT:  LAWYERS’ FIDUCIARY KNOWLEDGE 
IN CIVIL AIDING AND ABETTING CLAIMS 
Focusing now beyond the claim’s background, this part delves into the 
different approaches taken by various state courts that have accepted the 
cause of action.  Part II.A outlines the constructive knowledge standard from 
the standpoint of supporting policy arguments advanced by legal scholarship 
as well as through case examples of constructive knowledge in action 
provided by the Minnesota and South Dakota Supreme Courts.  Part II.B 
delves into the arguments against the constructive knowledge standard and 
examines two alternative approaches to the knowledge element:  the 
 
(“[V]irtually every jurisdiction recognize[s] that an attorney does not owe a duty to exercise 
care for the benefit of opposing parties or non-clients.”). 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1975). 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 45. While the scope of this Note concerns only the aiding and abetting of fiduciary breach 
claim, there are various other doctrines providing further exceptions to the general “no 
liability” rule of lawyers to nonclients.  For an opinion supporting the recognition of a lawyer’s 
full fiduciary duty to nonclients in certain instances, see Leroy v. Allen, 872 N.E. 2d 254, 286 
(Ohio 2007) (“[A]n attorney retained by a fiduciary owes a similar duty to those with whom 
the client has a fiduciary relationship.”). 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (articulating that an attorney is liable if 
she “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself”); see also Lewinbuk, supra 
note 10, at 151–53.  While the knowledge element is not incorporated by all states accepting 
the aiding and abetting cause of action, “[a] number of jurisdictions that have examined the 
issue, including New Jersey, Oregon, Colorado, South Dakota, New York, Illinois and 
Minnesota [incorporate this element into the aiding and abetting analysis].” See id. at 151–52. 
 47. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 150.  Notably, Colorado does not incorporate the 
substantial assistance element in its analysis. See Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 254 
(Colo. App. 2005) (articulating only the first three elements of the traditional aiding and 
abetting a fiduciary breach claim’s framework), reversed on other grounds by 152 P.3d 497 
(Colo. 2007). 
 48. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 141–45. 
 49. See id. at 151–53. 
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alternative knowledge standard, as applied in Illinois and Delaware, and the 
qualified immunity standard adopted by Texas. 
A.  The Constructive Knowledge Standard 
Multiple state court opinions have articulated the constructive knowledge 
standard as a requirement that a lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, 
of fiduciary relationships and surrounding breaches in order to satisfy the 
knowledge element.50  Part II.A.1 provides the scholarly commentary 
surrounding this standard.  Part II.A.2 provides an example of the standard’s 
application to a business-partner dispute analyzed under South Dakota law.  
Finally, Part II.A.3 provides a corollary application of constructive 
knowledge to a dispute surrounding trust and estate administration under 
Minnesota law. 
1.  Commentary Surrounding 
the Constructive Knowledge Standard 
Stanley Pietrusiak Jr. once commented that “[l]awyers’ position in society, 
and their collective legal experience, suggest that they should ‘know better’ 
than to aid in another’s breach of fiduciary duties.”51  Pietrusiak thus 
advances what the law and economics school has termed a “cheapest cost 
avoider” argument.52  He proceeds by linking the expansion of the lawyer’s 
role to the expectation that a lawyer should be held responsible for those 
aspects of their craft that are reasonably known to competent practitioners.53  
The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers echoes the argument 
linking a lawyer’s expanded role to his ability to reasonably perceive the 
contours of fiduciary relationships with which she is involved.54 
This policy viewpoint arguably has become the standard view of liability 
for attorney malpractice liability generally.  In his seminal article exploring 
the fault lines of attorney liability, Professor Geoffrey Hazard articulates a 
widely accepted view providing the constructive knowledge standard as 
sufficient to trigger a red flag for attorney liability.55  While this view does 
not necessarily argue that constructive knowledge is (or should be) 
dispositive of attorney malpractice liability, it presents a key evidentiary 
indicator.56  As a result, an argument in favor of constructive knowledge as 
a doctrinal standard organically emanating from existing attorney conduct is 
 
 50. See infra Part II.A.2–3. 
 51. Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 15, at 256. 
 52. The “cheapest cost avoider” argument is that lawyers are in the most economically 
efficient position to identify fiduciary relationships and assess the associated risks.  This Note 
discusses (and rejects) this view infra Part III.B.3. 
 53. See Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 15, at 256. 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“A Lawyer is usually so situated as to have special opportunity to observe whether the 
fiduciary is complying with [her] obligations.”). 
 55. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships:  An 
Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987). 
 56. See id. 
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possible.57  To assess these ideas in action, this Note now turns to examples 
provided by the South Dakota and Minnesota Supreme Courts. 
2.  South Dakota’s Constructive Knowledge Standard:  
Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover 
In one of the clearest state court opinions explaining a jurisdictional 
application of the aiding and abetting claim to lawyers, Chem-Age Industries, 
Inc. v. Glover58 provides a further example of a business partnership gone 
awry.  In March of 1997, an entrepreneur named Byron Dahl approached two 
potential investors in Watertown, South Dakota (Roger O. Pederson and 
Garry Shepard).59  The proposed venture was to be called “Chem-Age 
Industries”:  “Dahl would contribute equipment and expertise,” while 
Pederson and Shepard would contribute capital.60  Following the initial 
investment by Pederson and Shepard and the formation of the new business, 
“Pederson obtained a report from a private investigator warning him that 
Dahl was a ‘crook’”:  one of Dahl’s prior investors had lost his home, while 
another investor lost $300,000.61  Despite the report, Pederson and Shepard 
continued to invest with Dahl.62  As a condition of further investment, 
however, Pederson and Shepard required “the business to be 
incorporated . . . [and] Dahl to get an attorney involved to set up the 
corporation.”63  Dahl accordingly engaged his attorney of twenty years, Alan 
Glover, to prepare and distribute the articles of incorporation.64 
The day after the South Dakota secretary of state issued the certificate of 
incorporation, Sam’s Club approved corporate credit for the business and 
similar credit approvals for the business from Bank One, American Express, 
and Norwest Bank followed shortly.65 
Soon after credit was secured for the business, Pederson and Shepard 
began to suspect Dahl of misappropriating corporate funds.66  As an 
investigation later revealed, “Dahl had accumulated large balances on the 
company’s credit cards for what appeared to be personal items.”67  Further, 
 
 57. See id.  However, this argument ignores the gulf between the consequences of failure 
to follow “best practices” for attorney conduct and full-blown malpractice liability:  while 
constructive knowledge may work as an indicator of dangerous waters for attorney conduct 
under the Hazard test, these prudent practices do not inherently endorse constructive 
knowledge as a basis for a valid malpractice claim asserted by a nonclient. 
 58. 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002). 
 59. See id. at 761. 
 60. See id.  It is unclear exactly what the business operations purportedly were. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 761–62.  The articles of incorporation were dated October 30, 1997, and the 
South Dakota secretary of state issued the final certificate of incorporation on November 6, 
1997. See id. 
 65. See id. at 762.  The Norwest Bank loan amounted to approximately $140,000; the 
bank’s understanding was that the money was to be used by the business itself rather than Dahl 
or any other individual associated with the venture. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. at 762 n.2 (“Items charged included ‘Hamburger Helper’; ‘Bailey’s 750 ml’; and 
‘Food & Beverage’ at the ‘Princess Tower Hotel, Freeport, Bahamas.’”). 
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while Glover and Dahl later informed both investors that they were 
negotiating the sale of the business’s assets to New Age Chemical, Inc., they 
did not disclose that the seller was actually listed as “Byron Dahl d/b/a BMD 
Associates, a South Dakota sole proprietorship” on the agreement dated as of 
November 11, 1998.68 
Moreover, the secretary of state sent Glover a “Notice of Pending 
Administrative Dissolution” for Chem-Age Industries, Inc.69  After 
consulting Dahl, Glover made the decision not to complete the filing required 
to stop the dissolution.70  Accordingly, the secretary of state issued a 
“Certificate of Administrative Dissolution” on September 19, 1999.71 
In October of 2000, Pederson and Shepard filed suit against Dahl and 
Glover,72 claiming that Glover breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and investors, both directly and indirectly.73  Among other claims, the 
investors alleged that Glover aided and abetted Byron Dahl’s breach of 
fiduciary duty owed to his business partners.74  As authority, the court looked 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance on the degree of 
knowledge required for an attorney to be found liable under the aiding and 
abetting doctrine.75  Additionally, examining the case law from other 
jurisdictions surrounding the knowledge requirement, the court held that 
while “actual knowledge may be required [in some cases], constructive 
knowledge will often suffice.  Constructive knowledge is adequate when the 
[defendant] has maintained a long-term or in-depth relationship with the 
fiduciary.”76  As a result, the court established an aiding and abetting claim 
incorporating constructive knowledge as the main trigger for attorney 
liability.77 
 
 68. See id. at 762–63 (“When later questioned, Glover was not sure of the relationship 
between Chem-Age Industries, Inc., and BMD Associates.”). 
 69. See id. at 763 (“Glover was thereby notified that Chem-Age Industries, Inc., was 
delinquent in filing its annual report as required by SDCL 47-9-1 and that the corporation 
would be . . . dissolved [without a completed filing] before September 13, 1999.”). 
 70. See id.  While Glover did consult Pederson and Shepard’s investigating attorney, 
Glover never directly notified either investor despite his role as the corporation’s attorney. 
 71. See id.  Notably, the corporation was reinstated about a year later in anticipation of a 
lawsuit against Dahl and Glover. 
 72. Among other related parties. See id. 
 73. Liability was asserted via (1) a claim of fraud by failing to disclose Dahl’s past scams, 
(2) a claim of conversion due to misallocated attorney’s fees and a gift of an office desk (from 
Dahl to Glover, charged to the corporate credit card), and (3) claims of legal malpractice under 
both a direct theory (as Glover’s client) and an indirect theory (the aiding and abetting of 
Dahl’s fiduciary breach). See id. at 763–76. 
 74. See id. at 773 (“Although he may not have directly breached a fiduciary duty, if Glover 
assisted Dahl in a breach of Dahl’s fiduciary duty, Glover may still be subject to liability.”). 
 75. See id. at 775  (“Another condition to finding liability for assisting in the breach of a 
fiduciary duty is the requirement that the assistance be ‘knowing.’  Knowing participation in 
a fiduciary’s breach of duty requires both knowledge of the fiduciary’s status . . . and 
knowledge that the fiduciary’s conduct [breaches] a fiduciary duty.” (citation omitted)). 
 76. Id. (citation omitted).  From an overall doctrinal perspective, this holding lessens the 
showing that is required to satisfy the third element of the claim relative to the actual 
knowledge standards adopted under Illinois and Delaware law. See infra Part II.B. 
 77. See Chem-Age Indus., 652 N.W.2d at 775. 
2016] AIDING AND ABETTING FIDUCIARY BREACH CLAIMS 1401 
In its formulation of a knowledge standard for this new claim under South 
Dakota law, the court acknowledged key policy arguments in favor of an 
actual knowledge standard in the overall context of limiting attorney liability 
to nonclient third parties.78  However, the court decided to allow third-party 
liability in scenarios of long-term relationships between fiduciaries, thereby 
establishing a constructive knowledge standard.79  Application of this 
framework to Glover’s relationship with Dahl led the court to find Glover’s 
acceptance of a gift80 from Dahl, coupled with his actual knowledge of 
Dahl’s prior scams, as sufficient to defeat summary judgment for the 
knowledge element.81  Overall, the court “affirm[ed] summary judgment for 
Glover on the claims of fraud and legal malpractice pertaining to [Pederson 
and Shepard as individuals] . . . .  [Yet, the court] reverse[d] and remand[ed] 
for trial the claims of conversion and aiding and abetting the breach of 
fiduciary duty.”82  The South Dakota court’s comfort with extending 
lawyer’s liability via application of the constructive knowledge standard 
mirrored a case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court three years prior. 
3.  Minnesota’s Constructive Knowledge Standard:  
Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom 
The 1999 case of Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom83 provides a 
corollary application of the constructive knowledge standard to aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach claims against accountants.84  Following the death 
of Wilfred Wolfson in 1968, Blair Wolfson and his mother, Elizabeth 
Wolfson, were named trustees of the two trusts maintaining the estate’s 
remaining property following the resolution of probate in 1977.85  In 1991, 
Elizabeth Wolfson created “the Revocable Trust,”86 naming Blair Wolfson 
 
 78. See id. at 769–70 (“First, the [traditional no third-party liability] rule preserves an 
attorney’s duty of loyalty to and effective advocacy for the client.  Second, adding 
responsibilities to non-clients creates the danger of conflicting duties.  Third, once the 
[traditional] rule is relaxed, the number of persons a lawyer might be accountable to could be 
limitless.” (citations omitted)).  In addition, the opinion also addressed the issue of putting 
attorney-client confidentiality at risk with the opening of nonclient liability via mechanisms 
such as relaxed knowledge standards. See id. 
 79. The South Dakota Supreme Court here, mirroring other jurisdictions, viewed long-
term relationships as inherently putting advising lawyers on constructive notice of a fiduciary 
relationship’s existence. See id. at 775. 
 80. The gift was a desk for Glover’s office. See id. at 762. 
 81. See id. at 776–77 (“Accepting such a ‘gift’ from a client like Dahl, who Glover knew 
had longstanding financial problems, raises a [valid] question of constructive knowledge and 
exposes the problem of improper, personal financial gain in assisting Dahl.”). 
 82. Id. at 773.  Notably, the court also found that a material question of fact existed as to 
the substantial assistance element, allowing the claim overall to be considered on the merits.  
See id. 
 83. 601 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1999). 
 84. See id. at 181–83.  While Witzman concerns accountants, it remains highly instructive 
as an application of a constructive knowledge standard within an aiding and abetting claim 
against lawyers. 
 85. Specifically, Blair Wolfson was designated the trustee of the “Residuary Trust” and 
Elizabeth Wolfson the trustee of the “Marital Trust.” See id. at 182. 
 86. While the opinion does not explicitly clarify the relationship between the Revocable 
Trust and the two trusts originally emanating from Wilfred Wolfson’s estate, it seems to imply 
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and Harvey Flom87 trustees yet “reserved for [herself] complete authority 
over the trust until her death [in April 1992].”88  Shortly after her death, Flom 
resigned authority over the Revocable Trust, leaving only Blair Wolfson as 
trustee.89 
Joyce Witzman90 was a beneficiary under all three trusts emanating from 
the estate.91  In 1993, Witzman brought a claim alleging that Wolfson 
breached his fiduciary duty as trustee.92  While Witzman’s direct claim 
against Wolfson reached a mediated settlement in 1994,93 Witzman filed a 
separate aiding and abetting claim against Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom 
(LL&F) for its role as Wolfson’s accountant during the alleged breach of 
trustee fiduciary duties.94  While the lower district court granted LL&F’s 
motion for summary judgment denying liability,95 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court examined the recognition of a cause of action for aiding and abetting 
fiduciary breach.96  Contrary to the lower court’s assessment, the court here 
found that “Witzman does not ask us to recognize a new cause of action,” 
rather, Minnesota has always “relied on the ‘well recognized’ rule ‘that all 
who actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, or who 
procure, command, direct, advise, encourage, aid, or abet its commission.’”97  
Applying this principle to LL&F, the court defined the elements of an aiding 
and abetting claim under Minnesota law that generally mirror the doctrinal 
structure recognized in other states.98  The court then examined Witzman’s 
 
that the Revocable Trust exists alongside the original two trusts, encompassing separate 
baskets of assets. See id. 
 87. A certified public accountant. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Ms. Witzman is Wilfred Wolfson’s daughter. See id. at 181–82. 
 91. See id.  Notably, Witzman’s brother Blair was also a cobeneficiary under the trusts at 
the time this case was originally brought before the court in addition to his role as sole trustee 
of all three trusts. 
 92. Specifically, Witzman filed three separate claims, each specifying that Wolfson 
“failed to provide accountings for the trusts, had paid himself excessive compensation and 
charged excessive fees to the trusts, had engaged in self-dealing and imprudent investments, 
and had taken advantage of opportunities as an individual.” Id. at 182. 
 93. Following payments to Witzman and retention of the remaining assets by Wolfson, all 
three trusts were then dissolved. See id. 
 94. See id. at 182–83.  The complaint against LL&F alleged a total of four counts:  
“professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, ‘Aiding and Abetting Breach of 
Trusts,’ and violation of the RICO Act.” Id. at 183.  Notably, Witzman also filed a claim 
against Wolfson’s attorney asserting the same claims, yet the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
federal district court’s dismissal of all claims due to an inadequate evidentiary showing. See 
id. at 183 (citing Witzman v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
 95. The court granted the motion “because ‘no confidential or fiduciary relationship 
existed between [Witzman] and [LL&F] . . . [and] Minnesota did not recognize a ‘common 
law cause of action for aiding and abetting’ [fiduciary breach].” See id. at 183. 
 96. See id. at 185–87. 
 97. Id. at 185–86 (quoting Greenwood v. Evergreen Mines Co., 19 N.W.2d 726, 733 
(Minn. 1945)).  Further, the court referenced section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and concluded that “Minnesota law does recognize a claim based on aiding and abetting the 
tortious conduct of another.” Id. at 186. 
 98. See id. at 187 (“A claim for aiding and abetting . . . has three basic elements:  (1) the 
primary tort-feasor must . . . [cause] an injury to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must know 
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claim against LL&F and held that, while the first element of injury was 
satisfied, neither the requisite showing of knowledge nor a sufficient showing 
of substantial assistance was present in Witzman’s claim.99  Defining the 
Minnesota knowledge element, the court accepted the constructive 
knowledge standard allowing liability for allegations of a long-term or close 
relationship.100  Interestingly, however, the court qualified constructive 
knowledge as being an appropriate alternative to actual knowledge only when 
there is a finding that the conduct is “a facial breach” of fiduciary duty.101  
Here, the court found no such facial breach for Wolfson’s applicable 
conduct102 and that LL&F reasonably could have believed that its client’s 
actions were “legitimate exercises” of a trustee’s authority.103  This result, in 
addition to a failure to show the other elements of the newly defined cause of 
action, led the Minnesota Supreme Court to affirm the lower court’s grant of 
LL&F’s motion for summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.104  While 
constructive knowledge remains an important approach to the knowledge 
element, there are two alternative frameworks:  the actual knowledge and 
qualified immunity standards. 
B.  Doctrinal Alternatives:  
The Actual Knowledge and Qualified Immunity Standards 
As opposed to the less demanding reasonable knowledge requirement of 
the constructive knowledge standard, the actual knowledge standard requires 
a greater showing of direct lawyer fiduciary knowledge.  The qualified 
immunity standard presents an even greater bar to liability by eliminating the 
knowledge inquiry entirely:  it specifies that liability to nonclient third parties 
is invalid so long as the attorney’s conduct falls within the attorney-client 
relationship.  Part II.B.1 outlines the arguments against the adoption of the 
constructive knowledge standard.  Part II.B.2 illustrates the application of the 
 
that the primary tort-feasor’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty; and (3) the defendant must 
substantially assist or encourage the primary tort-feasor.”). 
 99. See id. at 187–88. 
 100. See id. at 188 (“[C]ourts have held that a defendant with a long-term or in-depth 
relationship with that [primary] tortfeasor may be deemed to have constructive knowledge that 
the conduct was indeed tortious.”).  This closely matches the standard outlined by the South 
Dakota Supreme Court in Chem-Age. 
 101. See id.  While the court inputs this qualification as a part of its knowledge analysis, it 
does not explicitly define this concept beyond the insufficiency of LL&F’s conduct in the 
instant case. 
 102. See id.  The court acknowledges that Wolfson’s failure to provide annual accountings 
of the three trusts was a facial breach of his fiduciary duty, yet “[the court] cannot infer that 
[LL&F] had [adequate knowledge] that Wolfson was engaging in tortious conduct damaging 
to Witzman.” Id.  Interestingly, this seems to add a second qualification to Minnesota’s 
application of constructive knowledge:  even if a facial breach is found in the context of a 
close relationship between the secondary and primary tortfeasors, the court still may engage 
in an additional inquiry as to reasonable knowledge. See id.  Thus, a close relationship here is 
seen as a sufficient showing of knowledge only at the court’s discretion. 
 103. See id.  It remains an open question whether the court would have held similarly for a 
lawyer as a defendant (rather than the instant case of defendant accountants) given a lawyer’s 
greater knowledge of a trustee’s fiduciary obligations. 
 104. See id. 
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Illinois actual knowledge standard to the familiar business-partner dispute 
scenario, while Part II.B.3 provides an example of the actual knowledge 
standard applied in the bankruptcy context under Delaware law.  Then, Part 
II.B.4 shifts focus to the qualified immunity standard in both the divorce and 
trust administration contexts. 
1.  Commentary Surrounding the Actual Knowledge 
and Qualified Immunity Standards 
This subsection examines the arguments against constructive knowledge 
in favor of the actual knowledge and qualified immunity standards as 
superior alternatives.  Specifically, the commentary focuses on three areas:  
(1) judicial resource concerns, (2) professional responsibility concerns, and 
(3) disruption of existing professional and economic structures. 
a.  Judicial Resource Concerns 
The debate between constructive and actual knowledge standards begins 
with the original concerns voiced by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion 
in Savings Bank:  without restriction of attorney liability to privity,105 there 
are concerns that attorney malpractice claims would be unlimited and thus 
have the dual effect of overwhelming judicial resources while also crippling 
the availability of counsel to American citizens.106  State courts cite this 
argument to this day, generally drawing a doctrinal line surrounding viable 
liability claims that require the conduct at issue to be outside, rather than 
inside, a clearly defined attorney-client relationship to be open to nonclient 
third-party liability.107 
b.  Professional Responsibility 
and Counsel Availability Concerns 
Professor Katerina Lewinbuk summarized the doctrinal problems arguably 
associated with a potential conflict between a lawyer’s duty to her client and 
exposure to liability from a third party:  “Attorneys [subject to third-party 
liability] will constantly try to balance their duty to zealously represent their 
clients with the fears of potential exposure to liability in instances where their 
legal advice may disregard the interests of the third parties.”108  As a result, 
the argument for the actual knowledge standard asserts that higher 
evidentiary requirements allow attorneys and their clients to rest easy 
 
 105. In the context of the case, the boundaries of liability defined by “privity” were taken 
to be synonymous with the attorney-client relationship outlined by contract.  See Sav. Bank v. 
Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 207 (1879). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See, e.g., Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015) (“Texas 
common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a [fiduciary duty] to third 
parties . . . .  Texas courts have [accordingly] developed a . . . defense protecting attorneys 
from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago [of the 
professional responsibility concerns surrounding such third party claims against lawyers].”). 
 108. Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 169–70; see also Cifu, supra note 32, at 17–23. 
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knowing that liability runs only to direct clients, barring truly overt 
knowledge of fiduciary breach.109  The Texas courts take this argument 
further, stating that even overt attorney knowledge is not enough for liability 
to attach if the alleged conduct occurred outside of the attorney-client 
relationship.110  In essence, the Texas qualified immunity standard returns to 
the classic rule of privity for attorney malpractice, providing a bright, 
doctrinal line defining liability along existing fault lines surrounding the 
attorney-client relationship.111 
c.  Disruption of Existing Professional 
and Economic Frameworks 
Further, an increase in attorney liability caused by constructive knowledge 
standards arguably triggers an increase in economic costs surrounding legal 
services.  In addition to the Savings Bank argument of increasing direct 
litigation costs stemming from unrestricted attorney liability,112 Professor 
Jeremy McClane’s recent article “The Sum of Its Parts:  The Lawyer-Client 
Relationship in Initial Public Offerings” provides a look at many of the 
transactional cost concerns surrounding initial public offerings.113  A key 
assertion the article posits is that disruption of a clarified attorney-client 
relationship leads to heightened transactional costs.114  Particularly, trust is 
often cited as a key requirement for allowing clients to focus on their 
commercial operations with the comfort of knowing that their attorney’s 
interests lie only with them.115  Again, the Texas qualified immunity standard 
of liability on precisely this basis arguably promotes clarity of relationships 
leading to more effective economic outcomes.116  Similarly, actual 
knowledge standards arguably have the practical effect of restricting attorney 
liability to third parties only when fiduciary knowledge is truly overt.117  
Ultimately, the argument posits that actual knowledge standards have the 
 
 109. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 169–70. 
 110. See, e.g., Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App. 
2005). 
 111. See id.  This clarifies and reinforces attorney duties only to their clients and eliminates 
concerns over third-party liability, which exist under a constructive knowledge theory. 
 112. See Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203 (1879). 
 113. See Jeremy R. McClane, The Sum of Its Parts:  The Lawyer-Client Relationship in 
Initial Public Offerings, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 131 (2015). 
 114. See id. at 150 (“Practitioner accounts are useful for understanding how lawyers and 
their clients perceive the impact of team dynamics on [deal] outcomes.  The lawyers 
interviewed for this study routinely listed familiarity and trust as key hallmarks of IPO deals 
that they experience as successful.”). 
 115. See id. at 150–51 (“[B]etter deals result when all the parties working on the deal seem 
to have a common vision . . . .  Further, when lawyers and clients work together frequently, 
they develop greater mutual trust . . . .  Trust allows clients to feel less need to monitor their 
lawyer-agents, freeing the client to focus on marketing and other commercial aspects.”). 
 116. See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015). 
 117. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bass, No. 04C5748, 2005 WL 936900 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 
2005), rev’d, 467 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the actual knowledge standard to a 
business-partnership scenario, explicitly denying application of a constructive standard, when 
it held that “nothing in the allegations even suggests that [the attorney] knew (as opposed to 
should have known) either that St. Pierre was engaged in a [breach]”). 
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effect of promoting the clarity and “common vision” that Professor McClane 
links to economically efficient transactional outcomes.118 
2.  Illinois’s Actual Knowledge Standard:  
Hefferman v. Bass 
Illinois law provides a further example of actual knowledge application in 
the classic context:  a dispute between business partners.  Presenting facts 
similar to Granewich, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hefferman v. Bass119 
illustrated the application of Illinois’s actual knowledge standard to an aiding 
and abetting fiduciary breach claim leveled against a lawyer from the 
business-partnership context.  In 2003, John St. Pierre approached Glen 
Hefferman, a former public school teacher, concerning the possibility of 
“becom[ing] [business] partners in a car wash [lease] in Skokie, Illinois.”120  
Hefferman agreed and “supplied about $25,000 for start-up costs, such as 
equipment and a lease.  Later on, Hefferman provided another $25,000 [and] 
also worked at the car wash several hours a day during the summer of 2003 
[without pay].”121  During that first summer, St. Pierre and Hefferman agreed 
that attorney Yale P. Bass would provide them legal advice and prepare any 
paperwork.122  “Bass assured Hefferman, ‘I’m your guy.  I’ll make sure 
you’re protected and you get what’s been agreed.’  Hefferman contend[ed] 
that Bass did no such thing.”123  Specifically, Hefferman alleged that Bass 
helped St. Pierre trick Hefferman into releasing his interest: 
[Bass] prepared a release . . . .  St. Pierre [then] showed up at Hefferman’s 
house in the middle of the night . . . and convinced Hefferman to sign [the 
release] by showing him only the second page, [stating] that St. Pierre 
indemnified and held Hefferman harmless from any liability under the lease 
of the car wash building.124 
Unbeknownst to Hefferman, the release’s first page specified that Hefferman 
relinquished his interest as an officer and stockholder in the car wash.125 
Hefferman then brought suit126 against St. Pierre and Bass.  The issue 
before the Seventh Circuit was whether Hefferman’s complaint stated a claim 
against Bass under Illinois law.127  The court ultimately reversed the lower 
court’s decision and held that Hefferman adequately pleaded a valid claim 
 
 118. See McClane, supra note 113, at 150. 
 119. 467 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 120. Id. at 598. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Hefferman originally brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois under federal 
diversity jurisdiction. See Hefferman v. Bass, No. 04C5748, 2005 WL 936900 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
15, 2005), rev’d, 467 F.3d 596.  While St. Pierre defaulted, Bass moved to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The district court granted the motion, holding that 
Hefferman had failed to state a claim against the attorney under Illinois law. See id.  Hefferman 
then appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 
 127. Hefferman, 467 F.3d at 598. 
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against Bass for aiding and abetting St. Pierre’s breach of the fiduciary duty 
he owed to Hefferman as a business partner.128  In examining the validity of 
the aiding and abetting claim under Illinois law, the court articulated that 
Hefferman’s allegation of Bass’s knowledge was sufficient by pleading that 
“Bass’s participation in St. Pierre’s . . . breach of fiduciary duty was knowing 
and intentional.”129  While this court provides a first look at the actual 
knowledge standard’s presence within the aiding and abetting doctrine, New 
York offers an example of Delaware Law’s application of the doctrine in the 
bankruptcy context. 
3.  Delaware Law’s Actual Knowledge Standard 
in New York Bankruptcy Court:  In re Ticketplanet.com 
Departing from the partnership freeze-out scenario, In re 
Ticketplanet.com130 concerned an internet-based travel agency, 
Ticketplanet.com (“the Debtor”), filing for bankruptcy on October 18, 
2001.131  The dispute involved the Debtor’s controlling shareholder, Ross H. 
Mandell, one of the Debtor’s directors, Michael Recca, the Debtor’s 
president, Michael Passaro, and the Debtor’s attorneys, Golub & Golub, 
LLC.132 
Prior to its bankruptcy filing, the Debtor “entered into a series of loan 
agreements with an entity called TPAC, LLC.  TPAC is owned and controlled 
by [the Debtor’s controlling shareholder, Ross Mandell,] and . . . [allegedly] 
was formed [solely] to advance funds to the Debtor and obtain a [resulting] 
security interest in substantially all of the Debtor’s assets.”133  Thus, at the 
time of the Debtor’s Chapter 11 filing, TPAC claimed a “first priority 
security interest” in the Debtor’s assets.134  As a result, the trustee’s claim 
asserts that the defendants schemed to defraud the Debtor’s estate and 
creditors and that the Debtor’s attorneys aided and abetted their breach of 
fiduciary duty.135  Beyond their status as the Debtor’s attorneys, however, 
the trustee’s complaint does not provide any further evidence that Golub & 
Golub had any knowledge of plans or intent to breach the fiduciary duty owed 
to the Debtor’s estate and creditors.136 
 
 128. See id. at 601–02. 
 129. Id. at 602.  Interestingly, the court links this higher knowledge standard within Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b):  “Rule 9(b) requires that facts . . . be alleged in detail.” See id. 
at 601 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).  Greater specificity of pleadings conceivably correlates 
with a more detailed actual knowledge standard rather than a less demanding constructive 
knowledge requirement, as Illinois law reflects with their articulation of a “knowing and 
intentional” standard within the aiding and abetting doctrine. See id. at 602. 
 130. 313 B.R. 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 131. See id. at 54. 
 132. See id. at 46. 
 133. Id. at 54–55. 
 134. Seemingly to the detriment of external creditors. See id. 
 135. See id. at 55–57. 
 136. See id.  Notably, even if such a showing of actual knowledge had been made, there is 
no evidence further showing that Golub & Golub substantially participated in such a scheme—
failing the final prong of the aiding and abetting doctrine. 
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In its analysis of the aiding and abetting claim against Golub & Golub, the 
court invoked pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
as a corollary to the aiding and abetting knowledge standard under New York 
law:  “[t]o pass muster under Rule 9(b) ‘a complaint must allege with some 
specificity the acts [at the core of the claim,] . . . conclusory 
allegations . . . are not enough.’”137  Applying this standard to the degree of 
knowledge that Golub & Golub had of their alleged participation in fiduciary 
breach through their status as Debtor’s attorneys, the court held that “the 
allegations of the [trustee’s] complaint are insufficient to state a claim against 
the law firm, whether stated as an aiding and abetting claim or otherwise, and 
they are dismissed.”138  The subtext provided by the court seems to indicate 
a rejection of sufficient knowledge showings on the sole basis of the close 
ties between Mandell, TPAC, and the Debtor itself.139  This division between 
Delaware’s and Illinois’s actual knowledge standard and a constructive 
knowledge basis for satisfying the doctrine’s third element represents a key 
conflict among jurisdictions that have accepted the aiding and abetting cause 
of action. 
4.  The Texas Qualified Immunity Standard:  
Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C. 
and Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd 
The 2005 Texas Court of Appeals case Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, 
P.C.140 illustrates the final approach to the aiding and abetting doctrine’s 
knowledge element:  the qualified immunity standard defining third-party 
liability in attorney-client relationships. 
From 1994 through 1998, Mark R. Riley acted as Robert Alpert’s attorney, 
both for the administration of personal trusts as well as the administration of 
multiple businesses in which Alpert was interested.141  In 1998, Riley and 
Alpert’s relationship deteriorated into a lawsuit surrounding administration 
of Alpert’s personal trusts in probate court.142  During that suit, Riley was 
represented by Crain, Caton & James, P.C. (“Crain Caton”).143  Alpert filed 
 
 137. Id. at 59 (third alteration in original) (quoting Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling 
Cooke Brown Holdings, Ltd., 85 F.Supp.2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see id. at 64 (“A 
conclusory statement, in the absence of facts from which one can infer knowing participation 
in a breach of duty, will not suffice.”).  Mirroring the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Hefferman, the court here relates specificity of pleadings required under Rule 9(b) to the 
greater specificity found within an actual knowledge standard relative to a constructive 
knowledge standard. See id. 
 138. Id.  Notably, the court further dismissed two related claims:  first, the court dismissed 
the claim of direct breach of a fiduciary duty owed by Golub & Golub to the Debtor’s estate 
and creditors (despite an overt admission by Golub & Golub that the attorneys directly owed 
a fiduciary duty to the Debtor). See id. at 64 n.11.  Second, the court dismissed an analogous 
claim that Michael Passaro aided and abetted Mandell and Recca’s fiduciary breach by hiring 
Golub & Golub (again due to an insufficient showing of knowledge). See id. at 64. 
 139. See id. 
 140. 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 141. See id. at 402. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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an additional claim against Crain Caton alleging that it, as Riley’s attorney, 
aided and abetted Riley’s fiduciary breach by “(1) concealing Riley’s 
malpractices and breaches of fiduciary duty; (2) filing frivolous lawsuits 
against Alpert in probate court; and (3) disparaging Alpert’s reputation in the 
business community.”144  Following the trial court’s dismissal order in 
2004,145 Alpert unsuccessfully appealed, resulting in an affirmation of the 
trial court’s dismissal of the claims against Crain Caton.146 
Specifically, the court of appeals examined the facts surrounding Alpert’s 
aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim.147  The claim centered on 
multiple sets of alleged facts148 surrounding Crain Caton’s conduct during its 
representation of Riley during the trust litigation.149  In response, Crain Caton 
filed “special exceptions,” relying on Texas’s qualified immunity rule 
protecting a lawyer’s conduct from liability provided that the conduct is 
within the lawyer-client relationship.150  This qualified immunity was at the 
core of the trial court’s decision to dismiss the aiding and abetting claims 
against Crain Caton and accordingly formed the reasoning behind the court 
of appeals’s affirmation of the dismissal.151  Here, the court scrutinized Crain 
Caton’s actions in its representation of Riley and held that the conduct existed 
fully within the bounds of the attorney-client relationship.152 
In its discussion of the dismissal, the court cited key policy arguments 
supporting the boundaries of lawyer liability around the contours of a lawyer-
client relationship rather than making the more typical inquiry into the 
lawyer’s knowledge.153  First, the court asserted existing standards of lawyer 
liability at common law as defined by privity within the lawyer-client 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id.  The trial court dismissal included an order for Alpert to pay sanctions 
amounting to $12,831.56, covering Crain Caton’s attorney’s fees. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. at 403–05. 
 148. The alleged facts surrounding the aiding and abetting claims included (1) “withholding 
and concealing the fact that he was turning Alpert over to government entities in order to 
obtain monies for himself and [Crain Caton],” (2) “making statements such as there were never 
any loans by Alpert to the Trusts when Riley and [Crain Caton] knew that such statements 
were false because . . . [Riley himself noted] that loans in fact were made,” and (3) “diverting 
more than Ninety Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000.00) of income tax returns from the [IRS] 
which were due to the Trusts and taking a substantial amount of that money and paying it to 
Riley and [Crain Caton].” Id. at 403–04. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 404–05 (“[The] special exceptions, [contend] that Alpert’s petition fails to 
state any cause of action against it.  Specifically . . . Alpert’s petition ‘fails to state a claim 
under Texas law for which relief can be granted’ because ‘[a]ll of the conduct made [on] the 
basis of [Alpert’s] claims occurred during the discharge of [Crain Caton’s] duties in 
representing their client . . . .’”). 
 151. See id. at 402, 404–05. 
 152. See id. at 407 (“Here, the acts [by Crain Caton] that Alpert alleges in his petition to 
support his claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty occurred during Crain 
Caton’s representation of Riley . . . .  Absent any allegation that Crain Caton committed an 
independent tortious act or misrepresentation, we decline Alpert’s invitation to expand Texas 
law to allow a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding and abetting’ a breach of 
fiduciary duty, based [solely] upon the rendition of legal advice to an alleged tortfeasor 
client.”). 
 153. See id. at 405. 
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relationship.154  The court thus asserted a type of stare decisis argument in 
favor of the qualified immunity standard, arguing that an incorporation of the 
knowledge inquiry by all state courts would be an untenable expansion of 
liability under Texas law.155  Second, the court outlined possible conflicting 
interests between a lawyer’s client and a third party to whom a lawyer might 
be liable as a key argument against the expansion of a lawyer’s liability 
beyond the attorney-client relationship.156  Third, the court echoed the 
Supreme Court’s original argument in Savings Bank concerning unlimited 
attorney liability157:  by extending liability outside of a relationship defined 
by privity (i.e., to third parties), liability for lawyers arguably has no limit.158  
Fourth, and finally, the opinion continually asked whether an “independent 
right of recovery”159 was available.  While indirect, the Texas appellate 
court’s particular framing of the immunity standard within the doctrine 
implies an argument that potential plaintiffs already have adequate existing 
methods of recovery via direct suits against the primary tortfeasor.160 
Ten years later, the Texas Supreme Court cited the appellate court’s 
decision in Alpert while applying the qualified immunity standard to the 
divorce context in Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd.161  In 2006, Philip Byrd and 
Nancy Simenstad initiated “highly contentious” divorce proceedings and 
Cantey Hanger, LLP represented Simenstad through the process.162  As part 
of the resolution of the divorce proceedings, Simenstad was awarded 
ownership of a Piper Seminole aircraft previously owned by Lucy Leasing 
Co., LLC.163  Specifically, the trial court ordered that “the parties . . . ‘execute 
with[in] ten days . . . any documents necessary to [complete] the transfers 
contemplated [in the court’s decree], which shall include . . . documents 
necessary to transfer ownership of airplanes and the like.”164  The dispute 
before the Texas Supreme Court concerned these transfer documents:  the 
complaint filed by Byrd alleged that Cantey Hanger aided and abetted the 
execution of a falsified “bill of sale transferring the Piper Seminole from 
 
 154. See id. (“At common law, the rule of privity limits an attorney’s liability to those in 
privity with the attorney.”). 
 155. See id. (“If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party . . . he would be 
forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his client’s best 
interest . . . .  Such a conflict hampers the resolution of disputes through the court system and 
the attainment of justice.  Thus, to promote zealous representation, courts have held that an 
attorney is ‘qualifiedly immune’ from civil liability, with respect to non-clients, for actions 
taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.”). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405. 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 406 (discussing the qualified immunity standard’s limitation of attorney 
liability to scenarios of independently tortious conduct even in cases of wrongful attorney 
conduct). 
 160. See id.  This framing also seems to exemplify a subtext of suspicion against plaintiffs 
asserting an additional claim against a defendant’s lawyer for purely economic reasons. 
 161. 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015). 
 162. See id. at 479.  The trial court eventually entered an agreed divorce in 2008. See id. 
 163. See id. at 479–80.  Notably, ownership of Lucy Leasing was awarded to Byrd. See id. 
 164. See id. at 479. 
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Lucy Leasing to a third party.”165  This sale shifted associated taxes from 
Simenstad onto Byrd, as the sole owner of Lucy Leasing, following the 
divorce settlement.166 
In response, Cantey Hanger filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting, among other things, the Texas qualified immunity standard as a 
defense for its conduct.167  While the trial court agreed and dismissed Byrd’s 
claims against Cantey Hanger with prejudice, the court of appeals reversed, 
finding Cantey Hanger’s conduct to be outside the parameters of the attorney-
client relationship.168  Thus, the Texas Supreme Court’s decision centered on 
the “scope and application” of the qualified immunity standard within the 
aiding and abetting doctrine.169 
While making its determination, the court articulated the standard as “a 
more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability 
to non-clients.”170  Further, the court emphasized the wide degree of 
protection offered within the attorney-client relationship as covering even 
wrongful conduct.171  However, the court reiterated the appellate court’s 
reasoning in Alpert by specifying that the immunity does not alleviate 
attorney liability to nonclients for conduct that exists outside of the attorney-
client relationship.172  Application of the standard to Cantey Hanger’s 
conduct led the court to hold that the drafting of aircraft sale documents 
following a divorce proceeding lies within the bounds of the attorney-client 
relationship, and thus the claim failed.173 
Interestingly, the dissenting opinion offered an alternative option to the 
broad application of the qualified immunity standard:  interpret the standard 
narrowly to apply immunity from attorney liability only to the original 
subject matter of the legal advice provided by the attorney.174  The dissent 
 
 165. See id. (“Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that[,] [through Cantey Hanger’s aid,] 
Simenstad executed the bill of sale as ‘Nancy Byrd,’ a ‘manager’ of Lucy Leasing, even 
though her last name had previously been legally changed to Simenstad and she ‘was never an 
owner, officer, or manager’ of Lucy Leasing.”). 
 166. See id. at 479–80, 484. 
 167. See id. at 479–80. 
 168. See id. at 480–81 (“The [appellate] court concluded that Cantey Hanger’s 
[alleged] . . . conduct involving the ‘subsequent sale’ of the plane awarded to Simenstad ‘was 
not required by, and had nothing to do with, the divorce decree,’ and thus was ‘outside the 
scope of representation of a client.’”). 
 169. See id. at 481. 
 170. Id.  This description orients the qualified immunity standard as going further than the 
general rule of no attorney liability to nonclients for legal malpractice—it is targeted to negate 
exceptions to the general rule (such as the aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim). See id. 
 171. See id. at 481–82. 
 172. Hence “qualified” immunity. See id. at 482 (“[I]t is the kind of conduct that is 
controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable.” (quoting Chapman 
Children’s Tr. v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App. 2000))).  Thus, the 
court seems to draw justification for the immunity by emphasizing availability of attorney 
liability for claims such as fraud or conversion. 
 173. See id. at 484–85 (“Cantey Hanger is entitled to summary judgment on its immunity 
defense if it conclusively established that its alleged conduct was within the scope of its legal 
representation of Simenstad in the divorce proceedings.  We hold that it did.”). 
 174. See id. at 486 (Green, J., dissenting) (“While I agree with much of the [majority]’s 
description of the attorney immunity doctrine and the purposes underlying it, I think the 
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looked to the history of Texas’s qualified immunity standard as the 
justification for its argument to restrict the immunity (and thus open attorney 
liability) to a greater extent than the majority opinion articulates.175 
III.  RESOLVING THE DISPUTE:  THE REJECTION 
OF CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE FRAMEWORKS 
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 
In this Note, the knowledge element is discussed not only for its value as 
an interesting element of the claim on its own but also as a key barrier to 
attorney liability overall.176  As a result, arguments surrounding attorney 
liability to nonclients can be appropriately considered surrogates for 
arguments surrounding the stringency of knowledge standards.  In other areas 
of the law, a defendant’s knowledge is held as a key evidentiary step in a 
showing of a valid cause of action.177  The same logic applies here, and the 
discussion of higher or lower evidentiary standards for this element can 
correctly be viewed as a proxy for effective restraint of the aiding and 
abetting doctrine.  This part first argues for the rejection of the constructive 
knowledge standard by examining the key fault lines of the debate:  (1) the 
incomplete nature of the constructive knowledge standard itself, (2) existing 
pleading standards, (3) professional responsibility concerns, (4) economic 
inefficiency, and (5) doctrinal consistency.  Second, this part provides 
guidance as to which scenarios seem ideal for the application of the actual 
knowledge standard rather than the qualified immunity standard. 
A.  The Constructive Knowledge Standard Is Incomplete 
State supreme courts have sometimes limited the practical effect of the 
constructive knowledge standard.  The South Dakota court’s Chem-Age 
opinion provides a look into the reasoning of a jurisdiction willing to accept 
the constructive knowledge standard by acknowledging that “in some 
instances actual knowledge may be required.”178  This admission that the 
constructive knowledge standard is not sufficient in certain scenarios 
characterizes it as incomplete unto itself, only to be applied in particular 
 
[majority] overlooks an important element of the form of attorney immunity at issue in this 
case—that the attorney’s conduct must have occurred in litigation—and applies the attorney 
immunity doctrine in a manner that results in a much broader, more expansive liability 
protection.”). 
 175. Specifically, the dissent noted that the historic application of the immunity and the 
supporting policy reasons under Texas law pertain only to actions taken “in serious 
contemplation of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.” See id. at 487. 
 176. As a key evidentiary requirement of the aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim, 
tougher knowledge standards theoretically decrease the extent to which a defendant is liable, 
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring a successful claim. 
 177. Referencing parol evidence concerns in contract law, mens rea restrictions found 
throughout criminal law, and similar inquiries into a defendant’s knowledge in other areas of 
tort law as key limitations on liability in various contexts.  For a discussion of barriers to 
recovery for criminal attorney malpractice, see David H. Potel, Criminal Malpractice:  
Threshold Barriers to Recovery Against Negligent Criminal Counsel, 1981 DUKE L.J. 542. 
 178. See Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 775 (S.D. 2002). 
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instances.179  The Minnesota Supreme Court echoed the partial applicability 
of constructive knowledge in Witzman by holding that constructive 
knowledge can apply only in scenarios of obviously wrongful attorney 
conduct.180  In effect, the Minnesota court justifies the lower evidentiary 
requirement of constructive knowledge by relying on stronger showings for 
a separate doctrinal element.181  Further, the court carefully articulated that, 
“where the conduct is not a facial breach of duty, courts have been reluctant 
to impose liability on an alleged aider and abettor for anything less than actual 
knowledge.”182  All in all, the constructive knowledge standard is incomplete 
in its application and relies upon actual knowledge as a doctrinal backup.  
Thus, rejection in favor of the doctrinally sound standards that already exist 
(actual knowledge and qualified immunity) would allow for clarity and ease 
of application looking forward. 
B.  Existing Pleading Standards 
as Instructive Evidentiary Guidelines 
As a key indicator of a claim’s sufficiency before a court, a growing chorus 
of state court opinions examining the aiding and abetting doctrine refers to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirement that claims are pleaded 
“with particularity.”183  Courts accordingly require a greater evidentiary 
showing for the elements of applicable causes of action, including aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach claims.184  Against this backdrop, constructive 
knowledge fails to require an adequately specific showing of attorney 
fiduciary knowledge for applicable claims:  rather than demanding particular 
evidence of attorney knowledge, constructive knowledge is satisfied even 
 
 179. Such as where a fiduciary duty was patently obvious to a reasonable attorney, despite 
a lack of an actual knowledge showing. See, e.g., id. 
 180. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999). 
 181. Such as a greater showing of the “substantial assistance” element of the claim. See id.  
Effectively, the Minnesota Supreme Court ignores a poor showing of knowledge in such 
instances of egregious wrongdoing by lawyers. 
 182. Id. 
 183. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 184. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) directly applies only to claims of fraud or 
mistake, courts often articulate this pleading standard as instructive to the analysis of evidence 
within aiding and abetting claims. See, e.g., Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 187 (“[I]n cases where 
aiding and abetting liability is alleged against [lawyers], we will narrowly and strictly interpret 
the elements of the claim and require the plaintiff to plead with particularity facts establishing 
each of these elements.”); see also In re Ticketplanet.com, 313 B.R. 46, 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The [plaintiff] alleges that the Defendants . . . knowingly made misrepresentations in 
connection with the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition . . . .  To pass muster under Rule 9(b) ‘a 
complaint must allege with some specificity the acts constituting [the claim,] . . . conclusory 
allegations . . . are not enough.’” (quoting Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown 
Holdings, Ltd., 85 F.Supp.2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).  This argument acknowledges that 
Rule 9(b) allows assertions of knowledge to be alleged “generally,” yet state courts have 
nonetheless interpreted “knowledge” to refer to actually, rather than constructively, alleged 
facts. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an 
allegation of an attorney’s participation in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty as “knowing and 
intentional” was sufficient, despite relaxed pleading standards for knowledge under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 9(b)). 
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when no specific showing is made.185  Within this analysis, many courts 
reiterate the knowledge element’s roots in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.186  This basis, in conjunction with the tendency of state courts to 
interpret a claim’s elements “strictly,” should lead to higher evidentiary 
standards.187  Thus, constructive knowledge fails to reflect the evidentiary 
requirements of preexisting standards adopted by state courts in the analysis 
of aiding and abetting claims. 
C.  Professional Responsibility Concerns 
Prior to the initial adoption of the aiding and abetting doctrine, states 
“feared that a more expansive duty to third parties would in some cases 
require an attorney to choose between advocating his client’s position and 
protecting a third party.”188  This concern, that an extension of liability 
beyond the attorney-client relationship will endanger the relationship itself, 
lies at the heart of the argument for the rejection of the constructive 
knowledge standard.  For this reason, bolstered by the following 
subarguments, the general rule for attorney liability has been to restrict 
malpractice claims only to direct attorney-client relationships.  Specifically, 
the argument can be articulated along three axes:  (1) the zealous advocacy 
doctrine, (2) availability of counsel concerns, and (3) the undermining of 
attorney-client confidentiality. 
1.  The Zealous Advocacy Doctrine 
and the Need for a Conflict-Warning System 
The key concern of the zealous advocacy doctrine is a conflict of interest 
between an attorney’s duty to their client and an attorney’s understandable 
action to safeguard against potential third-party liability.189  As Professor 
Lewinbuk and others have argued, the availability of nonclient fiduciary 
breach liability against an attorney creates an interest that competes with the 
attorney-client relationship due to the attorney’s fear of liability from a 
source other than her client.190  The key to solving this problem is to 
implement a conflict-warning system within the doctrine:  by defining the 
 
 185. Such as when long-term relationships are held to be an adequate showing of 
constructive attorney knowledge of fiduciary relationships and associated breaches. See 
Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 775 (S.D. 2002) (“Constructive knowledge 
is adequate when the aider and abettor has maintained a long-term or in-depth relationship 
with the fiduciary.”). 
 186. See id. (“Another condition to finding liability . . . is the requirement that the 
assistance be ‘knowing.’”). 
 187. See Chem-Age Indus., 652 N.W.2d at 775. 
 188. Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, supra 
note 17, at 1552 (underscoring the policy reasoning behind the traditional “no liability” 
standard concerning malpractice claims against lawyers from nonclients). 
 189. For a full discussion of the zealous advocacy doctrine and its application to 
government advocacy, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics 
of the Federal Government Lawyer:  The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 
(1991). 
 190. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 169–70. 
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knowledge element in a way that ensures attorneys and their clients can 
clearly identify and efficiently manage any liability interests that run counter 
to the direct attorney-client relationship, state courts have an opportunity to 
strengthen a lawyer’s ability to zealously advocate on her client’s behalf 
while still maintaining policy goals within the doctrine surrounding tort 
liability. 
One way to accomplish this conflict-warning goal is to define the 
boundaries of liability along the existing fault lines of the attorney-client 
relationship.  The qualified immunity standard accomplishes this directly by 
denying liability to third parties provided that the attorney’s conduct falls 
within the attorney-client relationship.191  Taken in isolation, the concerns 
surrounding the zealous advocacy doctrine’s protection of the attorney-client 
relationship favor the application of the qualified immunity standard to 
attorney aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claims.  Actual knowledge is 
similarly favored by the zealous advocacy doctrine for the same reasons. 
While less direct, the application of the actual knowledge standard also 
provides a conflict-warning system that allows attorneys to practice without 
undue fear of interests that run counter to the attorney-client relationship.  If 
evidence of attorney knowledge must be truly overt for third-party liability 
to be possible, attorneys and their clients have a clear and tangible indicator 
of potential countervailing interests far beyond that of constructive 
knowledge.192  This would then allow the attorney-client relationship to 
proceed comfortably without fear of nonobvious countervailing interests. 
2.  Availability of Counsel Concerns:  
Ensuring Accurate Information 
Within the Legal Marketplace 
Following a successful aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim against 
an attorney by a nonclient, lawyers, potential clients, and other groups 
surrounding the legal profession will bear this result in mind when judging 
that attorney’s ability to provide counsel.  Thus, malpractice claims 
effectively serve as an important source of evaluative professional 
information for colleagues and potential clients within the legal marketplace.  
It follows that unrestricted nonclient attorney liability will lead potential 
clients to form opinions of an attorney’s ability based on nonclient conduct 
rather than her direct client representation.193  This incongruence between 
direct client and nonclient malpractice information can be easily overlooked 
and lead an observer to draw inaccurate and unfounded conclusions.  
Accordingly, it behooves jurisdictions that have accepted the claim to 
articulate a knowledge standard that protects the legal marketplace.  By 
ensuring the accuracy and relevance of malpractice information to direct 
 
 191. See Cantey Hanger, LLC v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). 
 192. The mere existence of long-standing and often nonobvious relationships between 
parties (defining a satisfactory showing of constructive knowledge) does not provide the same 
degree of warning as the overt and direct evidence required by actual knowledge, particularly 
in complex transactional or dispute scenarios. See, e.g., McClane, supra note 113. 
 193. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 168–72. 
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client conduct rather than confusing the marketplace with nonclient 
malpractice information, a potential client can then make accurately informed 
decisions for her own direct representation.  Without an accurate and relevant 
marketplace for information, potential clients will be deprived of otherwise 
valuable legal counsel due to incongruence between the direct client 
relationship they seek and the nonclient evaluative information provided. 
The constructive knowledge standard already has allowed attorney aiding 
and abetting fiduciary breach claims to succeed on the basis of long-term 
party relationships.194  This ease of access to liability provides no safeguard 
that malpractice information will be limited only to direct-representation 
scenarios relevant to the legal marketplace.  Conversely, the qualified 
immunity standard solves the problem by limiting aiding and abetting 
fiduciary breach liability to only those scenarios where an attorney’s conduct 
falls outside of the attorney-client relationship.  As a result, malpractice 
claims will inform the marketplace only of instances that actually speak to a 
lawyer’s ability to directly represent their clients.  The actual knowledge 
standard also provides a solution:  an attorney that has overt and direct 
knowledge of potential fiduciary liability is on direct notice of a potential 
risk.  This standard thus ensures that malpractice information is, at minimum, 
an adequate reflection of an attorney’s ability to perceive and react to known 
risks emanating from relationships between parties.  Therefore, while it offers 
a less direct safeguard to information accuracy than qualified immunity, the 
actual knowledge standard provides comfort that malpractice claim 
information in the legal marketplace is informed by direct representation 
scenarios and associated risk assessments made by an attorney. 
3.  Undermining Attorney-Client Confidentiality 
In the context of aiding and abetting fiduciary breach disputes, previously 
confidential attorney-client information will necessarily be entered into the 
public record due to the claim’s knowledge requirement.195  As a result, the 
attorney aiding and abetting fiduciary breach doctrine poses a serious risk to 
confidentiality that lies at the heart of the attorney-client relationship, and the 
knowledge element accordingly defines this risk within a given state by 
forming a weaker or stronger barrier to liability depending on the adopted 
knowledge standard.196  In fact, the possibility of nonclient liability will 
likely affect an attorney’s approach to confidentiality before a claim is even 
brought—a prudent attorney would then be forced to, at least in some 
 
 194. See, e.g., Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002). 
 195. Professor Lewinbuk underscores the need to show a lawyer’s knowledge surrounding 
her representation of a client as the primary source of this problem:  “Such disclosure [of 
otherwise confidential information] will likely be unavoidable in a majority of aiding and 
abetting cases as the attorney will need to establish how much she knew or did not know about 
her client’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty.” Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 170. 
 196. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1068–69 (Or. 2006) (“[A] third party’s 
claim against the lawyer that puts the lawyer at odds with the client will compromise the 
lawyer-client relationship . . . .  [A]llowing a claim against the lawyer may raise issues of 
lawyer-client privilege, if the preparation of an adequate defense for the lawyer would require 
the disclosure of [confidential] communications.”). 
2016] AIDING AND ABETTING FIDUCIARY BREACH CLAIMS 1417 
manner, anticipate disclosure of otherwise confidential information.  The 
mere anticipation of breaching confidentiality can diminish, if not destroy, 
the trust that lies at the core of the attorney-client relationship.197 
Again, the qualified immunity standard provides a solution:  by 
eliminating liability for conduct within the attorney-client relationship, no 
need for disclosure of that conduct or associated information would ever 
arise.  Actual knowledge also provides an answer by restricting the scope of 
an examining court’s inquiry to explicit evidence of a lawyer’s knowledge 
rather than engaging in the normative inquiry of relationship length and depth 
that defines the constructive knowledge standard.  As a result, both qualified 
immunity and actual knowledge preserve attorney-client confidentiality to a 
far greater extent than constructive knowledge. 
D.  Economic Efficiency Concerns 
This section shifts to the goal of economic efficiency as a backdrop to this 
Note’s argument for the rejection of constructive knowledge.  Accordingly, 
this section focuses on two main arguments:  (1) the rejection of lawyers as 
cheapest cost avoiders and (2) the heavy economic burdens associated with 
unrestricted liability of lawyers to nonclients. 
1.  Lawyers Are Not the Cheapest Cost Avoiders 
Judge Richard Posner defines a goal of judicial policy as finding the lowest 
cost avoider and placing the applicable responsibility on them.198  This tool 
of the law and economics school acts as a policy guide in scenarios where a 
doctrine must decide which parties are suited to bear a legal responsibility in 
the most efficient manner.  In the attorney aiding and abetting context, this is 
the logic underlying the conclusions of scholars like Pietrusiak, who argue 
that the expansion of the lawyer’s role justifies the lawyer’s doctrinal mantle 
as a cheapest cost avoider.199  This argument is wrong. 
While the lawyer’s role has expanded within society and the wider 
economy, that expansion does not necessarily indicate a greater ability to 
perceive relationship structures and associated risks.  Particularly among 
increasingly complex transactional contexts,200 the direct participants are in 
the best position to perceive the nature of those relationships.  While lawyers 
are increasingly more involved in guiding and advising the formation of 
 
 197. See id. 
 198. Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents:  A Reassessment, 64 
MD. L. REV. 12, 16 (2005) (“[T]he goal is defined as finding the ‘cheapest cost avoider’ and 
putting the legal responsibility on him.  It provides a useful way of beginning to think about 
legal doctrines [and] procedures . . . .”). 
 199. See Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 15, at 256. 
 200. Fortune Magazine recently noted that global mergers and acquisitions activity “hit 
$3.5 trillion in 2014, which is up 47% from [2013] . . . .  Thomson Reuters also reported that 
there was nearly $562 billion of global private equity activity in 2014.  That’s the industry’s 
highest mark since 2007, and a 43% bump over 2013.” Dan Primack, 2014 Was a Huge Year 
for M&A and Private Equity, FORTUNE (Jan. 5, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/05/2014-
was-a-huge-year-for-ma-and-private-equity/ [https://perma.cc/R3VC-VSY3]. 
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fiduciary relationships, the true architects are the fiduciaries themselves.  In 
the Granewich case, the partners directly participating in the business were 
in the best position to assess their relationship because it was conceived of, 
and ultimately formed, by the business participants themselves rather than 
their lawyers.201  In fact, there are entire professions organized around 
making financial and business judgments that advise fiduciaries of the ideal 
pathways to initiating a relationship.202  While a lawyer is sometimes 
involved in this process as well, the exercise of business judgment is not an 
attorney’s primary role.  Direct fiduciary participants, however, play the 
primary role of defining those relationships.  As a result, the cheapest cost 
avoiders are the direct participants in fiduciary relationships because they can 
most easily be depended on to know the nature of the relationships they craft.  
Accordingly, adopting jurisdictions need to define the aiding and abetting 
knowledge element in a way that primarily targets direct fiduciary participant 
knowledge in the resolution of disputes rather than less efficient alternatives.  
Once again, qualified immunity and actual knowledge provide solutions. 
The qualified immunity standard allows fiduciary knowledge to be 
efficiently maximized by restricting liability only to those instances in which 
the conduct was not that of an attorney but a direct fiduciary participant 
whose primary role is to define and act within the fiduciary relationship in 
question.  Rather than engaging in a subjective inquiry surrounding the 
lawyer’s knowledge, qualified immunity makes an objective inquiry asking 
simply whether the attorney conduct falls within the direct attorney-client 
relationship.203  Effectively, this eliminates subjective dependence on a 
lawyer’s knowledge and shifts the knowledge inquiry onto the cheapest cost 
avoiders:  direct relationship participants. 
Actual knowledge similarly allows for normative inquiries surrounding 
fiduciary relationships to be isolated only to direct relationship participants 
rather than attorneys.  The standard’s requirement of overt and direct 
evidence of lawyer’s knowledge provides the solution:  rather than 
constructively look to a lawyer as the primary source of any such knowledge, 
we consider the claim viable only if the lawyer has overt and obvious 
knowledge beyond what would be initially expected of a typical attorney-
client relationship.  In this sense, actual knowledge also does not engage in 
any subjective analysis of the lawyer’s knowledge of the relationship, 
because a key tenet of this approach is its requirement that the degree of 
knowledge actually demonstrated by the facts exceeds a typical attorney-
client interaction.  As a result, this option provides some flexibility to account 
for the lawyer’s expanding role:  when a lawyer is engaged in defining 
relationships to such an extent that she essentially behaves as a direct 
participant and have overt and obvious fiduciary knowledge, then that 
knowledge is still being efficiently maximized.  Thus, actual knowledge also 
 
 201. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). 
 202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
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remains an effective tool to restrict normative judicial inquiries into party 
relationships only to direct participants rather than attorneys.204 
2.  Economic Burdens 
of Constructive Knowledge Liability 
This subsection addresses the economic costs, both direct and indirect, that 
are triggered by a constructive knowledge framework for the aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach doctrine.  Specifically, this section addresses (1) 
direct economic costs of these disputes and (2) indirect costs emanating from 
the resulting erosion of economic structures surrounding the attorney-client 
relationship. 
a.  Direct Economic Costs 
With each aiding and abetting claim successfully leveled against attorneys, 
direct costs materialize in the form of judicial docket overcrowding and 
increasingly severe costs within each claim.  Professor Lewinbuk has noted 
that courts have already seen an increase in nonclient attorney malpractice 
claims,205 and recent data indicates that costs associated with each such claim 
against lawyers also are rising.206  As mentioned, the aiding and abetting 
claim’s evidentiary elements act as controls on these costs.207  Accordingly, 
the knowledge element plays a key role in determining not only the number 
of claims brought against attorneys but also the level of cost associated with 
each claim.  While a lax knowledge standard (i.e., constructive knowledge) 
ostensibly leads to greater costs and docket flooding, a more demanding 
standard (such as actual knowledge) would sufficiently mitigate these 
concerns by requiring evidence that a lawyer’s fiduciary knowledge was truly 
overt to trigger a claim’s validity.  Considering also the potential for frivolous 
claims raised by nonclients against attorneys, the adoption of a constructive 
knowledge standard leads to potential misallocation of judicial and economic 
resources, both in the macro sense of case backlog as well as the micro sense 
of rising individual case costs.  As a result, adopting jurisdictions should 
weigh direct judicial and economic costs against any inclination to implement 
lax evidentiary standards, particularly against the implementation of a 
constructive knowledge standard. 
 
 204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51. 
 205. See Lewinbuk, supra note 10, at 137–41.  Arbitrary increases in attorney liability 
hearken directly to the Savings Bank’s majority opinion’s worry of overwhelming judicial 
resources with such claims. See Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199 (1879). 
 206. For a survey detailing the increasing severity of recent legal malpractice claims, see 
AMES & GOUGH, LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CLAIMS TRENDS:  2015 INSURER SURVEY 
(2015), http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/adjunct/dstevenson/007a%20Legal%20Malpractice% 
20Claims%20Survey%202015%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XMA-TF5F]. 
 207. See Sav. Bank, 100 U.S. at 207. 
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b.  Indirect Costs:  Erosion of Existing Economic Structures 
Changing any professional relationship’s core framework endangers not 
only the direct relationship’s participants but also the economic structures 
that depend upon it.  As the lawyer’s role expands and the attorney-client 
relationship evolves accordingly, it is essential to note the orientation of the 
surrounding economic systems:  as the attorney’s role deepens, the 
transactions and disputes at the core of modern legal work have become 
increasingly more complex.  In these contexts, clients understandably trust in 
the exclusive loyalty of their attorney rather than considering third party 
conflicts triggered by nonclient liability.208  As Professor McClane addresses 
in his analysis of initial public offerings, the possibility of diminished trust 
between an attorney and client can be fatal to a complex transaction.209  The 
ease of nonclient access to attorney liability through a constructive 
knowledge standard underscores these concerns:  by allowing an adequate 
knowledge showing from such a low evidentiary bar as the duration of a 
fiduciary relationship, it is possible that constructive knowledge is satisfied 
even in complex scenarios where lawyers truly have no fiduciary knowledge.  
As a result, the attorney-client relationship surrounding complex transactions 
and disputes is eroded due to the possibility of nonclient attorney liability.  
Legal and economic costs to clients associated with those transactions and 
disputes, although not necessarily a direct result of an aiding and abetting 
claim, will then increase due to the ever-present specter of potential 
conflict.210  Thus, constructive knowledge liability triggers widespread risk 
by eroding attorney-client trust of the core of these relationships and the 
framework of the economic structures they govern.211  Again, the qualified 
immunity and actual knowledge standards provide key safeguards against 
this risk by limiting liability only to conduct outside the attorney-client 
relationship (in the case of qualified immunity) or those instances of overt 
attorney fiduciary knowledge (in the case of actual knowledge). 
E.  Doctrinal Consistency Concerns 
This section now addresses the negative effects that adoption of 
constructive knowledge has upon the soundness of tort doctrine.  This section 
 
 208. Their lawyers also make this assumption too, following the general rule of no civil 
liability to nonclient third parties. See supra Part III.C. 
 209. See McClane, supra note 113, at 150–51. 
 210. Decisions based on trust within an attorney-client team that are normally quick and 
efficient will take longer and require a less efficient use of resources. See id. 
 211. See generally Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes:  A Study in Financial Innovation, 
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012) (discussing increasing 
complexity of financial transactions in the modern context and the associated systemic risks); 
Eugene M. Katz & Theodore M. Claypoole, Willie Sutton Is on the Internet:  Bank Security 
Strategy in a Shared Risk Environment, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 167 (2001) (addressing the 
increasing complexity of technological security concerns surrounding interbank and intrabank 
transactions); Natalie A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring a Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-
Around:  Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 
2188–92 (2015) (discussing problematic structural disruptions in complex transactional and 
dispute resolution scenarios). 
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comprises two arguments:  (1) adequate existing liability from a policy 
standpoint and (2) hydraulic balancing and the maintenance of a consistent 
nexus of proportionality for tort liability. 
1.  Adequate Existing Liability 
Notably, claims such as fraudulent attorney conduct, misappropriation, 
and conversion often are considered totally separate claims from aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach.  Thus, these claims are not foreclosed by failure to 
satisfy the aiding and abetting doctrine.  Rather, these actions are considered 
outside the boundaries of a professional relationship between attorney and 
client.  Thus, the attorney’s allegedly tortious conduct is analyzed as that of 
an ordinary party.212  Again, this illustrates, from a policy perspective, the 
unnecessary nature of aiding and abetting claims falling short of, at 
minimum, actual attorney fiduciary knowledge.  Moreover, aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach claims exist in the context of direct liability claims 
against the attorney’s client.  Thus a nonclient third party already has 
sufficient recourse against both attorney and client by way of direct fiduciary 
breach claims without the second bite at the apple provided by a constructive 
knowledge standard. 
2.  Hydraulic Balancing 
and the Nexus of Proportionality 
Within the aiding and abetting claim’s extension of attorney liability 
beyond traditional boundaries, firm evidence of fiduciary knowledge must be 
required to preserve the central nexus of proportionality that has defined the 
development of tort liability.  By ensuring a hydraulic adjustment of 
evidentiary standards when liability arises from increasingly attenuated 
relationships,213 tort doctrine maintains its status as an objective standard of 
liability proportionate to the closeness of party relationships and the evidence 
of wrongdoing between those parties.  There are two doctrinal examples that 
can be used to show hydraulic balancing of relationship closeness against 
evidentiary requirements as applied to the aiding and abetting claim:  (1) the 
adjustment from the duty of care (under a negligence rubric) to the duty of 
loyalty (under a fiduciary rubric) and (2) the comparison of direct negligence 
liability to vicarious negligence liability under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. 
a.  From Macpherson to Meinhard 
The original formulation of fiduciary liability under Meinhard established 
a direct hydraulic association between the closeness of the relationship 
between the parties and the required evidentiary showings for liability of 
 
 212. See, e.g., Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 406–07 (Tex. App. 
2005). 
 213. In this instance, fiduciary breach liability outside of a fiduciary relationship (between 
an attorney and a nonclient). 
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those parties to each other.214  The extension of lawyer fiduciary liability to 
nonclients under the aiding and abetting claim can effectively be viewed as 
an analogous increase in the obligations that a lawyer owes to a party outside 
of the attorney-client relationship (being elevated from negligence duty to 
fiduciary duty), yet the relationship between an attorney and a nonclient 
remains attenuated and thus disrupts the relationship-evidence balance.  
Following the doctrinal “ratcheting” that balances the closer relationship of 
the fiduciaries in Meinhard with greater evidentiary obligations215 than were 
required under the negligence-based analysis of Macpherson, it follows that 
aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claims should require greater evidence 
of knowledge than negligence-like constructive knowledge requirements.216  
Thus, constructive knowledge is an inappropriate standard for jurisdictions 
wishing to maintain this balance because constructive knowledge would 
effectively equate fiduciary and negligence evidentiary standards despite the 
closer nature of relationships in a fiduciary context. 
b.  From Direct Negligence Liability 
to Vicarious Negligence Liability 
A second example of hydraulic balancing of the closeness of party 
relationships against greater evidentiary requirements is the existing 
extension of negligence liability from employer to employee under 
respondeat superior.  This doctrine preserves proportionality by balancing the 
extension of liability beyond an employee to an employer against greater 
evidentiary requirements demonstrating an employer-employee relationship 
between the primary tortfeasor (the employee) and the secondary tortfeasor 
(the employer) in applicable claims.217  As with the move from negligence to 
fiduciary liability, this shift from direct to vicarious liability provides 
guidance for arguing that evidentiary requirements should heighten as the 
relationship defining liability becomes more attenuated.  Thus, vicarious 
liability provides an analog arguing for a knowledge standard more rigorous 
than constructive knowledge.  For this reason, qualified immunity or actual 
knowledge are more favorable options for application within the aiding and 
abetting claim. 
 
 214. See generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).  A closer relationship 
triggers a fiduciary duty rather than a negligence-oriented duty of care.  The obligations of a 
fiduciary are strict—“the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”—compared to the “morals 
of the marketplace” that guide the negligence-based duty of care. See id. at 546.  As 
relationships between parties become more attenuated, more evidence is thus required for a 
valid claim. 
 215. For example, higher fiduciary obligations only attach upon the finding of a prior 
business partnership. See id. 
 216. Such a standard would require only that the lawyer “reasonably should have known” 
of the impending fiduciary breach for liability to attach. 
 217. For a discussion of the requirements for a finding of employer-employee vicarious 
liability, see generally Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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F.  Future Guidelines:  When to Apply Actual Knowledge 
Versus Qualified Immunity Standards 
The above arguments leave courts with two options for the knowledge 
standard:  qualified immunity or actual knowledge.  This section considers 
two decisive axes that courts must consider when choosing the ideal standard:  
(1) whether liability should be based on evidentiary knowledge or preexisting 
standards surrounding the attorney-client relationship and (2) whether the 
adjudicating court favors inquiries into the merits of the attorney’s conduct 
or a clear rule that attaches liability on the basis of relationships alone.  
Further, this section addresses a decision to be made if the qualified immunity 
standard is chosen:  whether the standard should be applied broadly, ruling 
out attorney liability for any conduct within the direct representation of a 
client, or narrowly, ruling out liability only for conduct within the initial 
scope of the counsel that the client requested from the attorney in question. 
1.  Evidentiary Knowledge Versus Relationships 
as a Basis of a Claim 
The doctrine surrounding the choice between qualified immunity and 
actual knowledge standards is clear:  if a court prefers a policy making an 
inquiry into a lawyer’s knowledge as a basis for liability, then actual 
knowledge is the appropriate standard.  Conversely, if a court prefers to 
dictate attorney liability along preexisting relationship standards, then 
qualified immunity is preferable. 
2.  Clarity of Law Versus Meritorious Conduct Inquiry 
The second fault line of analysis is whether a court wants to engage in an 
inquiry into the merits of attorney conduct or prefers a bright-line rule 
demarcating attorney liability to third parties around the attorney-client 
relationship alone.  If an adjudicating court prefers the former method of 
analyzing the attorney’s conduct in the context of evidence (or lack thereof) 
of overt fiduciary knowledge, then actual knowledge is the appropriate 
standard.  Implicit within any inquiry into knowledge is an analysis of the 
attorney’s reaction to any fiduciary knowledge she has.218  Thus, actual 
knowledge still provides an avenue for judicial review of the merits of 
attorney conduct with knowledge as a defining backdrop.  Qualified 
immunity, conversely, makes no such inquiry.  The sole inquiry, at least 
initially,219 under this standard is whether the attorney conduct at issue falls 
within the attorney-client relationship.220  As a result, this standard provides 
 
 218. For example, if an attorney has overt knowledge that her client has a fiduciary 
obligation to a nonclient third party and fails to act in response to that knowledge, this interplay 
between knowledge and failure to respond would be key to an adjudicating court’s analysis 
under the aiding and abetting fiduciary breach doctrine. 
 219. See infra Part III.F.3 (concerning further decisions as to the breadth of liability’s 
applicability). 
 220. See generally Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005). 
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the bright-line rule that will advance the policy of clear application of law 
favored by many adjudicating courts. 
3.  Within Qualified Immunity:  
Broad Versus Narrow Application 
Once a court has made the decision to adopt a qualified immunity standard, 
a secondary decision needs to be made:  should the standard be applied 
broadly (providing greater limitation of attorney liability) or narrowly 
(providing less protection to attorneys facing nonclient liability)?  This 
difference was highlighted in the dissenting opinion of Cantey Hanger.221  
While the majority accepted a broad interpretation of qualified immunity,222 
the dissenting opinion disagreed:  it argued that the standard should be 
applied narrowly, conferring protection only to conduct within the subject 
matter of the attorney’s initial employment rather than to all attorney-client 
conduct.223 
As a result, qualified immunity jurisdictions have the option to make a 
further policy decision:  whether to broadly apply protection to the attorney-
client relationship or further qualify the immunity by requiring the protected 
conduct to fall within the specific subject matter of the attorney’s initial 
employment.  Broad immunity provides far-reaching protections of the 
practice of law, advancing the policies above.  While narrow immunity 
decreases this protection somewhat, this could provide an option to courts 
that wish to apply bright-line relationship rules yet harbor concerns about the 
overrestriction of attorney liability.  All in all, the Cantey Hanger dissent 
opens a door to further policy tools at the disposal of qualified immunity 
jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The constructive knowledge standard must be rejected in favor of the 
actual knowledge or qualified immunity alternatives when aiding and 
abetting fiduciary breach claims are made against attorneys by nonclients.  
The civil aiding and abetting fiduciary breach claim originated out of the 
body of twentieth-century jurisprudence surrounding fiduciary liability.  
When leveled against attorneys by nonclients, the four key elements that 
compose the claim lead to multiple concerns when placed against the 
backdrop of the legal profession and the surrounding attorney-client 
relationship.  One of those elements in particular, the element examining the 
attorney’s fiduciary knowledge, presents such concerns.  The two current 
standards of interpreting attorney fiduciary knowledge, constructive 
knowledge and actual knowledge, in conjunction with the qualified immunity 
 
 221. See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Tex. 2015) (Green, J., 
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 222. Articulating that the protection from liability extends to any conduct within the 
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 223. In the case of Cantey Hanger, this was divorce litigation and settlement. See id. at 479. 
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standard (rejecting any such knowledge inquiry), compose the current range 
of approaches to the knowledge element. 
Constructive knowledge provides a problematic choice for five central 
reasons.  First, the constructive knowledge standard is incomplete and relies 
on either actual knowledge or other elements of the claim as a doctrinal 
fallback.  Second, the well-established use of existing pleading standards as 
guidelines for evidentiary requirements is disrupted by the lower standards 
of constructive knowledge.  Third, attorney liability emanating from 
constructive knowledge triggers professional responsibility concerns 
surrounding the viability of the attorney-client relationship.  Fourth, 
constructive knowledge liability triggers economic efficiency concerns 
applying both directly to attorney-managed transactions and disputes, as well 
as indirectly to wider economic structures.  Fifth, and finally, constructive 
knowledge would render the doctrine of civil liability inconsistent as a whole. 
To mitigate these concerns as well as provide a sound doctrine of tort 
liability for the twenty-first century, courts should look to the alternatives of 
actual knowledge and qualified immunity, which provide more objective, 
clear, judicially sound, and economically efficient results.  Within these 
alternatives, this Note has outlined remaining options for courts to tailor the 
knowledge element to fit their individualized policy goals.  The rejection of 
constructive knowledge in favor of either actual knowledge or qualified 
immunity allows for a doctrinally sound approach while maintaining the 
necessary protection of the professional and economic frameworks 
surrounding the attorney-client relationship. 
 
